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McGrath v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15  
(June 7, 2007)1
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW – WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review of the appeals 
officer’s decision denying compensation, in a worker’s compensation case.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed.  When a claimant alleges that a stress-related injury was caused by a gradual 
escalation of stress over a period of time, the injury is not compensable under Nevada workers’ 
compensation law.  Rather, NRS 616C.180,2 indicates that a worker’s compensation claimant 
must establish a causal relationship between her mental injuries and a discrete, identifiable, 
traumatic event in a time of danger.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellant Lori McGrath was an employee of respondent, the Nevada Highway Patrol 
(NHP), and the founder of NHP’s K-9 program.  McGrath alleges that she was the target of a 
campaign of harassment and abuse orchestrated by coworkers and superior officers.  McGrath’s 
specific allegations, while not directly relevant to this appeal, include the cancellation of the K-9 
program in retaliation for McGrath’s decision to file a complaint with the Equal Employment 
                                                 
1 By Jeremy K. Cooper 
2 NRS 616C.180 specifies the circumstances under which injuries caused by job-related stress are 
compensable as follows: 
 1.  Except as otherwise provided in this section, an injury or disease sustained by an   
 employee that is caused by stress is compensable pursuant to the provisions of chapters  616A to 
616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS if it arose out of and in the course of his  employment. 
2.  Any ailment or disorder caused by any gradual mental stimulus, and any death or 
 disability ensuing therefrom, shall be deemed not to be an injury or disease arising out of  and in 
the course of employment. 
3.  An injury or disease caused by stress shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of 
employment only if the employee proves by clear and convincing medical or psychiatric evidence 
that: 
              (a) He has a mental injury caused by extreme stress in time of danger; 
             (b) The primary cause of the injury was an event that arose out of and during the course 
of his employment; and 
(c) The stress was not caused by his layoff, the termination of his employment or any 
disciplinary action taken against him. 
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Opportunity Commission, inappropriate sexual advances, and a series of groundless internal 
affairs investigations initiated by coworkers. 
            In December 2002, McGrath was diagnosed with severe stress-related mental and 
physical injuries.  She suffered physical symptoms such as chest pains, exhaustion, weight gain 
despite loss of appetite, gastrointestinal issues, and ulcerations in her mouth and throat.  McGrath 
and her physicians attributed these symptoms to an accumulation of stress from events occurring 
during August 2001 and December 2002.  However, neither McGrath nor her physicians 
identified a distinct occurrence giving rise to the stress.  Because of these stress-related injuries, 
McGrath states she was unable to resume her job at NHP until November 2003.  During this 
time, McGrath lost a year’s worth of pay and seniority. 
            In December 2002, McGrath took a leave of absence and filed a workers’ compensation 
claim.  The Sierra Nevada Administrators’ claims adjuster denied her claim.  The denial was 
affirmed by a hearing officer who determined that McGrath had failed to meet the statutory 
requirements of NRS 616C.180 for a compensable work-related stress claim.  An appeals officer 
affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.  The appeals officer concluded that, pursuant to NRS 
616C.180, McGrath’s stress-related injuries did not arise “out of and in the course of [her] 
employment.”  The appeals officer concluded that McGrath’s injuries were not compensable 
because they were not caused by stress that could be traced to a discrete, identifiable event in 
time of danger, as required under NRS 616C.180(3).  Instead, according to the appeals officer, 
McGrath’s injuries were caused by a “gradual mental stimulus” which is not compensable under 
NRS 616C.180(2). 
           McGrath filed a petition for judicial review.  The district court denied McGrath’s petition.  
McGrath appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court.  The Court affirmed the district court’s denial 
of McGrath’s petition.  
 
Discussion 
Standard of Review
            The Court limited its review to the appeals officer’s interpretation and application of 
NRS 616C.180.  The Court applied a plenary standard of review, rather than a deferential 
standard of review, because the review concerned an administrative ruling and its application of 
a statute.  
            The Court cited Banegas v. SIIS, 117 Nev. 222, 225 (2001), ruling that “[w]hen a statute's 
language is plain and unambiguous, [the Court] will give that language its ordinary meaning” 
based on the presumption that the Legislature intended to use words in their usual and natural 
meaning.  However, the Court added that when construing a statute, if there is more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the statute is ambiguous and it should be given a meaning that is 
consistent with what the Legislature intended, based on reason and public policy. 
The plain, unambiguous language of NRS 616C.180 requires a claimant to identify a 
discrete, traumatic event that caused a stress-related injury.  The Court stated that a claimant 
must show that a stress-related injury or disease falls under this definition by satisfying the three 
conditions, as set out in NRS 616C.180(3). Two of the required conditions were at issue in this 
case.  McGrath must have demonstrated that she had a mental injury “caused by extreme stress 
in time of danger” and that the primary cause of the stress-related injury was an “event” arising 
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out of and during the course of her employment.3  The Court also noted that, pursuant to the 
definition of “an injury arising out of and in the course of employment,” NRS 616C.180(2) does 
not allow any ailment or disorder caused by any gradual mental stimulus.  Thus, the statute bars 
compensation for such stress-related injuries, even if the aforementioned requirements are met.4
Time of Danger
           NRS 616C.180(3)(a) requires a claimant to demonstrate that she suffered “a mental injury 
caused by extreme stress in time of danger.”  The Court concluded that the statute’s plain 
language indicated that McGrath had to demonstrate that she suffered a sudden and tangible 
injury as the result of extreme stress at a time when she was exposed to harm.  The Court held 
that the “appeals officer properly determined that McGrath’s status as a patrolwoman did not, on 
its own, prove that her injuries were caused by ‘extreme stress in time of danger’” because the 
record, did not contain evidence that McGrath’s injuries resulted from the extreme stress of a 
dangerous traffic stop. Furthermore, the mere fact that McGrath carried a firearm on patrol did 
not necessarily create a perpetual “time of danger.”    
Event
            McGrath contended that the “event” requirement of NRS 616C.180(3)(b) is ambiguous.  
The Court disagreed stating that the word “event” is generally defined as “a noteworthy 
occurrence or happening . . . an unusual or significant development”5 and, as such, the statute’s 
plain language does not permit a claim for stress built up over the course of multiple incidents.  
Rather, the plain language meaning requires a claimant to demonstrate that his or her stress was 
caused by a discrete, identifiable occurrence.  Thus, when read as a whole, the statute provides 
that any “disease” that results from a “gradual mental stimulus” is not compensable.  The “event” 
must be a sudden, tangible, traumatic experience.   
Gradual mental stimulus
           The Court found that the statute’s plain language distinguished between stress-related 
injuries brought on by a sudden occurrence or singular instance and those brought on by a 
gradual escalation of stress.  NRS 616C.180(2) excludes from coverage stress-related injuries 
caused by “any gradual mental stimulus.”6  Accordingly, the Court concluded that NRS 
616C.180 unambiguously required a claimant to identify a discrete, identifiable, traumatic 
occurrence that gave rise to stress. 
Therefore, McGrath was not entitled to compensation because she did not establish a 
causal relationship between her mental injuries and a discrete, identifiable, traumatic event in a 
time of danger.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 When a claimant alleges that a stress-related injury was caused by a gradual escalation of 
stress over a period of time, the injury is not compensable under Nevada workers’ compensation 
law.  Rather, NRS 616C.180 indicates that a worker’s compensation claimant must establish a 
                                                 
3 NRS 616C.180(a) and (b). 
4 NRS 616C.180(2). 
5 WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 573 (1976). 
6 NRS 616C.180(2). 
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causal relationship between her mental injuries and a discrete, identifiable, traumatic event in a 
time of danger.   
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